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New Wine, Old Bottles, Flamboyant Sommelier: Chávez,
Citizenship, and Populism
Anthony Peter Spanakos
Montclair State University
Abstract At points of crisis of political representations and economic insecurity,
populists are more likely to emerge. That was true of earlier forms of populism in Latin
America and it seems to be so now. There are some important differences though and
these are shown by exploring Chavismo as an “extreme” case study of populism.
Chávez has pushed a model of citizenship which is antithetical to neoliberal models in
that it encourages politically engaged citizens, increases worker rights through an
increasingly interventionist state, and encourages anti-imperialist solidarity and
actions. By understanding how populist orientations of Chávez created possibilities and
constraints on that citizenship, social scientists can better understand what populism is
and is not.

In a frequently downloaded video posting, Venezuelan President Hugo
Chávez referred to US President George W. Bush as a “donkey,” “genocidist,”
and an “alcoholic” amongst other niceties.1 On the floor of the general
assembly of the United Nations, he referred to Bush as “the devil.”2 Chávez’s
critics have used similarly inflammatory language to describe him.3 But what exactly
is Chávez?
Ellner and Hellinger argued that he is neither an authoritarian nationalist,
along the lines of Nasser, nor a neopopulist like Fujimori.4 Since then, identifying
exactly what Chávez is and over what sort of government he presides has been
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2
See ,http://www.youtube.com/watch?v¼binMjEiS8AY. (accessed September
18, 2008).
3
Steve Ellner, Rethinking Venezuelan Politics: Class, Conflict, and the Chávez Phenomenon
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publications, 2008).
4
Steve Ellner and Daniel Hellinger, “Conclusion: The Democratic and Authoritarian
Directions of the Chavista Movement,” in Steve Ellner and Daniel Hellinger (eds), Venezuelan
Politics in the Chávez Era: Class, Polarization & Conflict (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003).
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somewhat of a growth industry.5 It has been especially important for those on the
left and those who study the left.6
Chávismo can be identified as a sort of left populism.7 It is left in that it
unabashedly identifies itself with socialism and economic redistribution. It is
consistently in rhetoric, and sometimes in policies, highly critical of neoliberalism
and capitalism (the latter less so). It is populist in the relative lack of clarity of its
ideology and programs, the multiclass base of its support, and its reliance on the
personal connection of a leader with masses of people who believe themselves to
be excluded.8
Though the nature of populism draws attention to the “charismatic leader,”9
populism in Latin America emerges cyclically, during times when the gulf
between citizen and state and market widens considerably.10 In this sense,
populism not only aims to reduce the spaces between the citizen and the state and
the citizen and the market during a crisis, but, in doing so, helps to reframe and
reconstruct the boundaries of citizenship. Collier and Collier show that populism
in Latin America was not simply a strategy but had long-term effects in terms of
“shaping the political arena”11 and one of the most important legacies of Chávez
may be that the new form of citizenship he promotes shapes how citizenship is
understood within Venezuela and other countries in the decades to come. While
there are many aspects of this citizenship, this article will highlight three: (1) the
importance of active engagement in politics; (2) participation in the market and
production for excluded sectors; and (3) defense of economic sovereignty and
promotion of solidarity with groups and states that share common goals or
threats. Each of these characteristics figures as part of a response to the
perceptions of the weakness of citizenship during the 1980s and 1990s.
Chávez’s populism infuses these areas with meaning which centers on citizen
rights and responsibilities, though not without considerable problems. Political
participation is encouraged through polarization and degrading the voice and
actions of opponents. Economic inclusion is most effective through consumption
which is more a product of commodity prices and an overvalued exchange rate
5
Anthony Peter Spanakos, “Que regime é este? The Left in Brazil, Chile, and
Venezuela,” Revista Análise Econômica-UFRGS 26:50 (September 2008).
6
Jorge G. Castañeda, “Latin America’s Left Turn,” Foreign Affairs 85:3 (2006),
pp. 28 – 43; Jorge G. Castañeda and Patricio Navia, “The Year of the Ballot,” Current History
(February 2007), pp. 51 – 57; Mathew R. Cleary, “Explaining the Left’s Resurgence,” Journal
of Democracy 17:4 (October 2006), pp. 35 – 49; Hector E. Schamis, “Populism, Socialism, and
Democratic Institutions,” Journal of Democracy 17:4 (October 2006), pp. 35 – 49; Marie
Kennedy and Chris Tilly, “Making Sense of Latin America’s ‘Third Left,’” New Politics 11:4
(2008), pp. 11– 16; Ellner, Rethinking Venezuelan Politics, op. cit.
7
Luke March, “From Vanguard of the Proletariat to Vox Populi: Left-populism as
a ‘Shadow’ of Contemporary Socialism,” SAIS Review XXVII:1 (Winter– Spring 2007),
pp. 63 – 77.
8
Michael L. Conniff, “Introduction: Toward a Comparative Definition of Populism,”
in Michael L. Conniff (ed.), Latin American Populism in Comparative Perspective
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1982).
9
José Pedro Zúquete, “The Missionary Politics of Hugo Chávez,” Latin American
Politics & Society 50:1 (2008), pp. 91 – 121.
10
Kenneth M. Roberts, “Latin America’s Populist Revival,” SAIS Review XXVII:1
(Winter– Spring 2007), pp. 3 –15.
11
Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, Shaping the Political Arena (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1991).
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than real changes in production processes. Finally, citizens who are sympathetic to
Chávez do demonstrate solidarity with other groups and countries that challenge
US hegemony, but this places them in the position of supporting regimes that
often reduce the space for citizenship and repress labor.
The first section of the article assesses the role of populism in Latin American
politics, emphasizing how populism enters Latin America during periods of
political and economic crisis. The article then looks to how Chávez perceived and
sought to solve a similar crisis in Venezuela by presenting a “protagonistic”
citizenship which rejects boundaries between citizen and representative, politics
and economics, and even Venezuela and other countries. In doing so, it relies on
secondary analyses of various Chávez-initiated programs and rhetoric as well as a
unique set of 92 in-depth interviews conducted in Venezuela between January and
August 2008 with sympathizers and opponents of the government. The interviews
are particularly important in that they give concrete evidence of the ideational
understanding of what citizenship means to citizens in a government that is
constitutionally defined as a “participatory and protagonistic” democracy. Since
populism emerges when there is a citizenship gap, how populism shapes
citizenship is fundamental for identifying populism. By exploring populism within
Bolivarian Venezuela, an extreme case, this article offers deeper understanding
and refinement of a critical concept for political inquiry in developing countries.
Populism and Citizenship in Latin America
The roots of the relationship between state and society in Latin America are
largely linked to populist moments in 20th century Latin America. The citizen, as a
bearer of political, civil, and economic rights,12 was formed in the midst of the
crises generated by the collapse of foreign markets for Latin American goods
during the Great Depression and the demographic shift toward urbanization and
industrialization which destabilized the hegemony of landed rural elites. From
these crises,13 a new regime with a different concept of state – society –market
relations emerged, engendering new forms of citizenship.
The collapse of foreign markets provided the impetus for endogenous
development and industrialization, shifting power from rural agro-exporters
toward nascent industrialists.14 The demographic shift from rural to urban, the
rise of organized labor, and the increased political salience of massified politics
created pressures on the new urban elites and the restricted democracies they
managed.15 Mass mobilization, particularly organized labor, made demands
for greater political and economic rights within multiclass alliances led by
charismatic leaders. Importantly, under the influence of populism Latin American
governments became more conscious of support amongst the masses, economic
12

1963).

T. H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class and Other Essays (London: Heineman,

13
Colin Hay, “Crisis and the Structural Transformation of the State: Interrogating
the Process of Change,” British Journal of Politics and International Relations 1:3 (1999),
pp. 317– 344.
14
H. W. Arndt, “The Origins of Structuralism,” World Development 13:2 (1985),
pp. 151– 159.
15
Peter H. Smith, Democracy in Latin America: Political Change in Comparative Perspective
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).
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rights and subsidies were established, suffrage was expanded, and organization
(at least within preferred unions) was encouraged. It was within this context
of state-led growth, populism, and opening but restricted democracies that the
modern citizen emerged in Latin America.
Although populist leaders from Juan Perón in Argentina to Getulio Vargas in
Brazil to Salvador Allende in Chile employed different manners of incorporating
their supporters,16 populists shared rhetorical claims which were anti-elitist,
inclusionary of marginal groups, and suspect of unregulated market activity.
Populist projects were elite-led, top-down, and often used popular support as a
means of strengthening the presidency vis-à-vis elite interests. Populists used
their ability to mobilize the masses as both a legitimating tool and leverage against
political opposition.
Populists often presented themselves to elites as non-Marxist, anti-communist
or even the only real alternative to socialism.17 At the same time, the new
repertoires of politics in which they were engaging occupied an ambiguous
position during the Cold War, particularly after the 1959 Cuban Revolution.
Indeed, populism and its specter were equally fundamental aspects of second
wave democracies in Latin America as well as the wave of authoritarianism that
replaced those regimes.18 Despite the instability of populist democracies and nondemocracies, populist leaders, parties, and, more importantly, populism became a
defining feature of social, political, and economic incorporation of the masses as
citizens in Latin America.
When the current wave of democratization began in Latin America in the
1980s, it was juxtaposed to economic emergency measures and the deregulation of
markets.19 Precisely when citizens were regaining their political rights qua citizens
their economic rights and the distributive obligations of the state changed quite
radically. State regulation of markets was reduced, state production largely
privatized, fiscal budgets cut, monetary policy was used exclusively to control
inflation, and the provision of public services was increasingly transferred to
private agents and/or nongovernmental agencies. In the midst of such a
transformation, analysts considered whether populism in Latin America was
dead.20 After all, populations seemed demobilized, organized labor weakened,
the informal sector ballooned, and few leaders saw a practical alternative to
neoliberalism, which was presented as the “responsible” other to populism.21

16

Collier and Collier, op. cit.; see also Roberts, op. cit.
March, op. cit. In the case of the Acción Democrática leaders of Venezuela and their
predecessor, Ellner writes “they . . . delayed raising the banner of socialism in order to
avoid a show-down with the nation’s conservative classes.” Steven Ellner, “Populism in
Venezuela, 1935– 48: Betancourt and Acción Democrática,” in Conniff (ed.), op. cit., p. 147.
18
Smith, op. cit. See also the argument made for instability in modernizing countries
more generally in Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order and Changing Societies (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1968).
19
Philip Oxhorn and Pamela K. Starr (eds), Markets & Democracy in Latin America:
Conflict or Convergence (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999).
20
Paul Drake, “Conclusion: Requiem for Populism?” in Conniff (ed.), op. cit. Also see
David Leaman, “Changing Faces of Populism in Latin America: Masks, Makeovers, and
Enduring Features,” Latin American Research Review 39:3 (2004), pp. 312– 326.
21
Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards (eds), The Macroeconomics of Populism in
Latin America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).
17
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By the 1990s most Latin American governments had eliminated high levels of
inflation through liberal inspired stabilization programs and voters rewarded the
politicians held responsible for that.22 In this context, Kurt Weyland improbably
called presidents like Carlos Menem in Argentina, Alberto Fujimori in Peru,
Fernando Collor in Brazil—all presidents who pursued neoliberal economics—
“neopopulists.” Although earlier populists were associated with redistributive
economic strategies, creation of rights for labor, and economic nationalism, Weyland
argued that neopopulists were populists because of the “personalistic, populist
leadership, which claims an electoral mandate from ‘the people’ but determines the
content of this mandate at will . . . ”23 And though neoliberalism involved reducing
the strength of organized labor, macroeconomic stabilization and overvalued
exchange rates created consumption booms which were reminiscent of earlier
populist episodes. Citizenship could then be increasingly understood in liberal
terms, specific rights detached from organized politics of contestation, and economic
participation from the side of consumption rather than production. Moreover, the
fragmentation of labor in the informal sector made broad ranging policies, like
overvalued exchange rates, produce multiclass benefits, while other policies
reduced “rigidities” in labor markets that had previously been considered “rights.”
Since the Asian crisis, Latin America has witnessed both a rise of the left and a
populism which has, at least rhetorically, rejected neoliberalism. The emergence
was not surprising given popular disappointment with democracy and inequality
following an era in which states’ control and participation in markets decreased and
authoritarian governments were replaced with electoral ones.24 Castañeda has
argued that the left has and should have a place in Latin America given the high
levels of inequality and the lack of social justice.25 There is also a potential appeal for
populism which, Conniff writes, is “a repudiation of those forces hindering popular
representation, social mobility, and rising standards of living for the masses.”26
At the same time, while persistently high levels of inequality, low growth, and
low-quality democracy encourage populism, the international context has also
been important. The end of the Cold War has reduced support for armed leftist
revolution and armed rightist resistance in most countries in the region, allowing
democracy to become the dominant form of government.27 Socialism is no
longer linked to the Soviet Union which both frees it from association with
totalitarianism allowing it to be a more acceptable term in mainstream political
discussions, but also makes it difficult to define it in any meaningful way. As such,
left populists like Hugo Chávez or Bolivia’s Evo Morales can speak of socialism
and use policies that are often entirely consistent with the state capitalism of
previous governments (of the right, center, or left).
Despite the relative ambiguity, Chávez claims to be building 21st-century
socialism and is doing so through left populist politics. This is particularly important
22
Susan C. Stokes (ed.), Public Support for Market Reforms in New Democracies
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
23
Kurt Weyland, “Neoliberalism and Democracy in Latin America: A Mixed Record,”
Latin American Politics and Society 46:1 (Spring 2004), pp. 135– 157 at p. 149.
24
See Roberts, op. cit.
25
Jorge G. Castañeda, Utopia Unarmed: Latin American Left after the Cold War (New York:
Vintage, 1994); Castañeda, “Latin America’s Left Turn,” op. cit.
26
Conniff, op. cit., p. 5.
27
See Castañeda, Utopia Unarmed, op. cit.
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for scholars as Chávez and chavismo constitute “extreme cases” for scholars
studying populists and populism, respectively. The collapse of the Punto Fijo
two-party system in Venezuela and the rise of Chávez28 can be “considered to be
protypical or paradigmatic of” the phenomenon of populism.29 For this reason,
exploring the contours of Chavismo’s contribution to new postulations of citizenship
helps scholars understand the possibilities and weaknesses of contemporary left
populism. Notably, in contrast with older versions of populism in that: though it is
highly top-down there is an important bottom-up component; it is more comfortable
with the label socialism than earlier versions; and the international context in which
Chávez asserts his project is propitious for developing countries aggressively
pursuing foreign policies that aim at multilateral balancing.
Bolivarian Citizenship
Venezuela is one of the few Latin American countries to have not one but two lost
decades (the 1980s and 1990s) during which there was virtually no economic
growth.30 The popular revolt of February 27, 1989, the “Caracazo,” was a
galvanizing moment in terms of resistance against a politician who had within
days of entering office, backtracked on electoral rhetoric and implemented an
austerity program.31 When two coup d’état attempts were launched three years
later, they received remarkable popular support,32 and the coup leader who made a
televised appeal to his comrades to turn themselves in, Lt. Colonel Hugo Chávez,
became an instant hero to many segments of the population. The two party system
that had dominated Venezuela since 1958 was unable to mount viable
governments and voters increasingly chose oppositional and then anti-political
candidates, culminating with the election of Chávez to the presidency in 1998. In
February 1999, when he took office, Chávez’s approval was over 80% in public
opinion polls, suggesting that almost the entirety of the country wanted change.33
Since coming to power, Chávez has claimed to lead a Bolivarian Revolutionary Process (el proceso revolucionario bolivariano) which has changed considerably
over the past decade. In 2005 Chávez announced that the proceso aims to create 21stcentury socialism, a term that serves better as a compass than an indication of
policy preferences.34 A more accurate label might be what Chávez calls “complete
democracy” ( plena democracia), a fulfillment of the new Constitution’s self28

Henry Dietz and David J. Myers, “From Thaw to Deluge: Party System Collapse in
Venezuela and Peru,” Latin American Politics and Society 49:2 (2007), pp. 59 – 86.
29
John Gerring with Jason Seawright, Case Study Research: Principles and Practices
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 101.
30
Julia Buxton, “Economic Policy and the Rise of Hugo Chávez,” in Ellner and
Hellinger (eds), op. cit., pp. 115, 113.
31
Margarita López Maya, “The Venezuelan Caracazo of 1989: Popular Protest and
Institutional Weakness,” Journal of Latin American Studies 35 (February 2003), pp. 117 – 136.
32
Daniel H. Levine and Brian F. Crisp, “Legitimacy, Governability, and Reform in
Venezuela,” in Louise W. Goodman, Johana Mendelson Forma, Moisés Naı́m, Joseph
S. Tulchin, and Gary Bland (eds), Lessons of the Venezuelan Experience (Washington, DC: The
Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995).
33
Keller & Associates, “La popularidad de Hugo Chávez,” personal communication
with the autor, no date.
34
Margarita López Maya (ed.), Ideas para debater el socialismo del siglo XXI (Caracas:
Editora Alfa, 2007).
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identification as a “participatory and protagonistic democracy.”35 This vision of
democracy claims to coexist and complement representative democracy, though it
is openly anti-liberal and aims to reconstruct and politicize public spaces. The
politicization of localities, of citizen struggles with water, food, need for sports and
recreational possibilities in shanty-towns (barrios36), coincides with a greater
politicization of political identity.
The most ideologically committed Chavistas see their citizenship in their
daily struggle against empowered and entrenched elites in order to assert
and preserve their own power. Citizenship is thus an agonistic struggle
against enemies, internal and external, and it calls for alliances spurred by
local political initiatives, mass rallies, as well as support for struggling “people”
(people who struggle against similarly perceived enemies) in other contexts
(geographic or historical).37 This presumes that the political is a broad and
expansive category in which popular participation is critical for both legitimacy
and consciousness-raising.38 The Bolivarian citizen, that is, the one who accepts and
adopts the vision promoted by Chávez, is therefore the antithesis to the more
truncated versions of citizenship which emerged in Latin America and much of the
developing world during the last two decades of the 20th century. That citizen’s
involvement in politics was voluntaristic, nongovernmental organizations and
social movements aimed for autonomy from the state, economic liberties
were privileged over entitlements, and US influence was considerable and
welcomed.39

35
See Daniel Hellinger, “When ‘No’ Means ‘Yes to Revolution’: Electoral Politics
in Bolivarian Venezuela,” Latin American Perspectives 32:8 (2005), pp. 8 –32. Chávez told
Aleida Guevara: “This is true democracy, extending far beyond formal political democracy
that limits choice to whether or not a particular governor should be elected.” Chávez
in Aleida Guevara, Chávez: Venezuela & the New Latin America (New York: Ocean Press,
2007), p. 49.
36
Though barrio conventionally means “neighborhood,” in Venezuela it refers to
shanty-towns. The word urbanización is used to connote a neighborhood and the
implication is that it is wealthy.
37
This is consistent with Žižek who writes “the true opposition today is . . . between
globalization (the emerging global market new world order) and universalism (the
properly political domain of universalizing one’s particular fate as representative of global
injustice).” Slavoj Žižek, “For a Leftist Appropriation of the European Legacy,” Journal of
Political Ideologies 3:1 (February 1998), pp. 988–1009 at p. 1007.
38
That is because “The political may be defined as everything that concerns . . . explicit
power. This includes the modes of access to explicit power, the appropriate ways of managing
it, and so on.” Cornelius Castoriadis, “Democracy as Procedure and Democracy as Regime,”
The Rising Tide of Insignificancy, translated from French and edited anonymously, p. 34,
, www.aporiainternational.org/englishtextc.html . . Maintaining politics within the
administration of government functions ignores the way in which power is constructed
and alternative ways of “managing it.”
39
Norbert Lechner, “The Transformation of Politics,” in Felipe Aguero and Jeffrey Stark
(eds), Fault Lines of Democracy in Post-Transition Latin America (Miami: North – South Center
Press, 1998). In distinguishing third wave from previous waves of democracies, Smith notes
the shift toward the center by much of the right and left and the reduction of space for
policy innovation and discussion. He finds that, current democracies in Latin America are
extraordinary in the restraint over public demands, that they are less utopian than in the
past. This evokes the work Utopia Unarmed by Jorge Castañeda who identifies two lefts—
one institutional and one radical, clearly favoring the former.
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Engaged, Partisan Citizens
The proceso has effected the common citizen, never before was there so much
protagonism in the political process. Here the people were mute. They voted and
returned to their house . . . Now, you are not only an observer of politics, you are
participating in politics . . . Now [the people] think “I am a protagonist in my own
process.”40
Now the institutions are in the streets.41

One theme that recurred throughout interviews with both pro-Chávez
residents of barrios who believe that they are protagonists of their own struggles as
well as opponents of the Chávez regime is that under the previous democratic
government, citizenship was largely limited to voting every five years and politics
was dominated by often corrupt institutions such as political parties, business
organizations, and organized labor.42 Resistance to this had always existed and
was visible during the 1980s and 1990s, but the rise of Chávez accentuated it,
massified it, gave it a name, and often funded it. By contrast, the Chávez vision of
the citizen assumes that citizens cannot transfer their sovereignty to
representatives but must remain the “protagonists” in their own drama. This
vision was enshrined in the 1999 Constitution which declares Venezuela a
“participatory and protagonistic” democracy.43
Chávez has been a candidate in or presided over 11 elections in 11 years including
consultative elections about whether to hold a constituent assembly, voting on the
new constitution, a referendum to revoke the president’s mandate, and a vote on
proposed constitutional amendments. Simply from the perspective of opportunities
to express voice through elections, Chávez has increased the political role of the
citizen. But the elections in Venezuela are more than simply ballot-checking moments
and Chávez’s polarization of politics has made every election in some way a
referendum on his leadership and an opportunity for his supporters to make their
claims against an elite class which victimized them and robbed them of the agency as
citizens for so long. Chavista discourse along with the opposition’s similarly
polarizing language make it nearly impossible not to take sides.44 Polarization also
encourages a centripetal tendency toward all politics around Chávez.
The centrality of Chávez is exaggerated by his ubiquitous presence in
television and print media. In addition to generating most of the news in the
country, he hosts a weekly several hour long television show on Sundays, Aló
Presidente, and he regularly engages in extensive public announcements which
private media are obligated to carry. On the often campy Aló Presidente, Chávez
engages in a deliberately popular and even vulgar discourse in which high politics
of diplomacy are mixed with everyday life concerns. Lampooned for the campy-ness
40

Teacher, Barquisimeto, March 5, 2008.
Government Official, Petare, May 2008.
42
Michael Coppedge, Strong Parties and Lame Ducks: Presidential Partyarchy and
Factionalism in Venezuela (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997).
43
Marı́a Pilar Garcı́a-Guadilla, “Civil Society: Institutionalization, Fragmentation,
Autonomy,” in Ellner and Hellinger (eds), op. cit.
44
Javier Corrales, “Oil and Polarization in Venezuela,” in Jonathan Eastwood and
Thomas Ponniah (eds), Revolution in Venezuela (Durham, NC: Duke University Press,
forthcoming).
41
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and demagoguery of this by the opposition, his supporters appreciate the
sincerity and accessibility, though some lament his use of foul language and his
constant threats to opponents. More importantly, his repetitive rhetoric easily
enters into their own and his constant discussion of politics has spurred the
valuation of politics amongst his supporters.
When asked “how often do you talk about politics?” the most common answer
given was “every day.”45 One pro-Chávez street vender said “often, everything is
politics.” A pro-Chávez junior high school teacher said “every day. I search out the
subject. It is the way to learn how to see how people think, because every person is
a political person . . . ”46 In shaping not only what is discussed but how it is
discussed, Chávez has changed the way that citizens interact with and dissect a
concept of politics which has grown increasingly into a spectacle presented on
television. His banalization of politics both reduces the technocratic pretensions of
neoliberal versions of citizenship while encouraging citizen debate and activity in
politics. Interviewees who supported President Chávez constantly referenced
their comments in terms of what Chávez said on an issue and spoke of how they
discussed these issues with people in their world (family, co-workers, other
people in community organizations). This shift from reflection in discussion to
action by claiming newly established rights through participation in newly
created public spaces is fundamental. So is the agonism of the spaces and the
sense that in claiming their rights citizens are re-claiming them from “oligarchs.”
The misiones47 and the other government programs and community-based
programs are generally given names that “belong” to the Bolivarian movement of
Chávez or are given military titles encouraging a perception that the new spaces
are not open to non-Chavistas. With the exception of Mercal and to a lesser extent
Barrio Adentro, these new spaces are seen as Chavista spaces. This is due to both
the incessant politicization of government acts by Chávez as well as the initial
rejection by members of the opposition of these programs. Regardless of who is to
blame/credit, the spaces are partisan and this is consistent with the emerging
understanding of citizenship. Citizenship, after all, is a project based on agonistic
struggles of the pueblo (“people”). The inherent assumption of enemies of the
people, a defining element of populist discourse, is constantly present. After all,
the misiones, barrio adentro, and other new structures are considered to be spaces
that have been given by Chávez and their existence is ensured by the
consciousness of rights-claiming citizens.
One architect who was being attended to on a Saturday at a fair of government
services in the barrio of Petare, remarked that it was good to have the services, but
45
Again, this is based on the investigator’s research in Venezuela in 2008 referred to
earlier.
46
Interviews conducted in Catia, Caracas, on April 12, 2008, and Carora, Lara, on
March 7, 2008.
47
The misiones are highly visible and popular manifestations of government reaching
out to its citizens. They include programs to reduce illiteracy (Robinson), give university
degrees (Ribas), reduce problems with eyes (milagro), support and spread popular culture
(cultura), remunerate women in barrios (madre de barrio), among other issues. The results of
these misiones are highly disputed although they are quite popular. See Mark Weisbrot, “An
Empty Research Agenda: The Creation of Myths about Contemporary Venezuela,” Center
for Economic and Policy Research Issue Brief (March 2008), p. 1, also p. 4; Francisco Rodrı́guez,
“An Empty Revolution: The Unfulfilled Promises of Hugo Chávez,” Foreign Affairs
(March/April 2008), pp. 49 –62.
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he wished they were not partisan.48 Similarly, one sociologist explained “I think
that the government invites participation but it does not create spaces of plurality
when it does so, there is a certain unidirectionality . . . ”49 This perception of a lack
of pluralism is worsened by the fact that the government makes no effort to
separate the missions and other state-funded enterprises from the government,
the president, the party, or the Proceso.50
Chávez rallies are peopled by many who come aboard buses that belong to
Misión Ribas, Misión Robinson, Misión Sucre, amongst others and are treated to
food and entertainment founded by the state. The sense of citizenship inherent in
a state-sponsored claims-making is radically different from that of the 1980s and
1990s when economic rights and subsidies were reduced and protests against
these changes were repressed by the state. Although critics of Chávez are correct
when they identify a lack of accountability when he says that government
problems are a matter of lack of revolutionary conscience and the failure of the
people themselves to act, this is consistent with the sense that the government will
create and establish rights and local institutions to provide them, but the citizens
must claim these rights and institutions. And it is by using barrio adentro, shopping
in mercal, having a friend who received a bachelor’s degree through a misión,
protesting against the “enemies” of Chávez/the people who want to roll back all
of those benefits that pro-Chávez informants believed that they exercised their
citizenship.
Perhaps the most important venture in the area of promoting an active, yet
partisan, citizenship is the creation of the communal councils. Created by decree
by President Chávez during a public broadcast, they were formed in law in June
2005.51 Basing itself on the idea of local participation found in the Constitution,
communal councils are organized units of between 200 and 400 families which
receive roughly $60,000 for infrastructural and other projects. By 2007, some
20,000 communal councils were registered with the government.52 The
community councils represent, according to Chávez, one of the fundamental
ways in which the Proceso will advance by building small communities that take
“co-responsibility” for affairs of local existence including media, sports, health,
education, urban or rural land issues, popular economy, security, water, and other
issues.53 Though the Chávez experimentation with local governance is part of a
history of neighborhood councils54 and other forms of local governance, emerging
particularly as a result of decentralization in the 1980s and 1990s, there are
important innovations of the communal council models, innovations which are
the direct result of the populist manner in which they were formed.
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The two most exhaustive studies of communal councils55 are highly critical of the
promotion, design, and administration of communal councils in Venezuela. There
are a number of reasons for criticism. First, rather than resulting from bottom-up
pressures to include citizen participation and to improve government efficacy, as
was the case in other countries, the Venezuelan communal councils were created by
a speech act of President Chávez, with no public debate.56 The irony of a space for a
self-assertive citizenry being decided with no popular consultation was not lost on
most commentators.57 Second, the relationship between the new local communities
and existing municipal governments is unclear. Whereas in the widely cited
experience in Porto Alegre (Brazil) participatory publics complement elected
municipal governments,58 it remains unclear whether communal councils are
intended to complement or replace municipal governments in Venezuela.59
Particularly concerning is that rather than being under and part of municipal
government as a means of rendering more robust ties between local government
and society, as is the case in Brazil, the communal councils operate under the
jurisdiction of the executive branch of the national government and create disincentives to coordinate with other local and municipal authorities.60 They therefore serve
to both increase autonomy vis-à-vis a micro-community against the municipal and
state level elite as well as decrease that autonomy vis-à-vis the president.
Though he uses a language and even creates institutional spaces which allow
for the possibility of greater participation, the context for creation of an active
citizen is shaped by the nature of Chávez’s left populism. Chávez encourages local
community action and the groups display more autonomy from Chávez than
might be expected,61 and although Chavismo is top-down as were previous
populisms in Latin America, bottom-up pressures are important and cannot be
denied.62 That said, the centralization of politics—its articulation, the shapes it
takes, how struggles are fought—within the figure of the leader in a populist
environment places a disproportionate amount of power in the leader. The
disproportionality is particularly stark when comparing semi-organized groups
of 200 – 400 shanty-town dwellers vis-à-vis a highly centralized executive branch
in a petro-state during a commodities boom.
Also, like previous populisms, Chavismo aims at inclusion of previously
excluded groups, relies on internal enemies, and citizenship becomes a curious
mix of partisan inclusion in which rights and socio-economic obligations are
granted following a period of political and economic crisis.63 However, they are
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granted through a process that is heavily tied to a leader and their guarantee is
limited by their partisan nature. This engenders an opposition (or an extreme
group within it) who see the new institutions and rights as ephemeral and believe
that elimination of the charismatic leader will restore previous concepts of the
citizen. This attitude seems to have guided those leading the coup against Chávez
in 2002. Its failure and the subsequent majoritarian electoral victories of Chávez
until 2007 attest to both the successful creation of a new concept of citizen as well
as the inability of that citizenship to be embedded within society absent the leader
who generated it.
Co-management and Consumption
The economic model has developed slowly, unevenly, and not without
contradiction.64 Notably, economic policy was liberal from 1999 until the coup in
2002.65 Since then, the model developed is one characterized by fiscal and
monetary expansion, centralization of distributional moneys through the
presidency, creation of social misiones (missions) in poor areas, threatening private
companies with expropriation, recovery of abandoned companies, subsidizing
economic cooperatives, and organizing workers in the “popular economy.” The
economic strategy of the Chávez government emerges in a context which
emphasizes the participation of excluded sectors in the market and production. It
does this by both encouraging worker co-management, cooperatives, and by
expropriating companies that fail to resolve labor troubles. This is standard fare for
left populism. Expropriations and extortion of private companies is part of a larger
geopolitical struggle (see next section). However, where Chavismo seems most
effective in terms of economic inclusion is not in the area of rights, co-management,
or recovered companies, but simply in the area of consumption, something that
was the foundation of the support for neopopulists.66
Excepting the first few years of his administration when oil prices were low,
government spending was restricted, and when political instability as a result of a
prolonged petroleum worker strike and a coup d’état, the Venezuelan economy
has grown considerably. One pro-Chávez think-tank writes that the economy “has
grown by more than 87 percent . . . [t]he poverty rate has been cut in half, and
unemployment by more than half.”67 Additionally, government spending has
increased from 18.8% of GDP in 1999 to 29.4% in 2007. Public sector employment
increased from 1.254 million people, or 14.6% of the workforce in 1999 to
2.17 million people or 18.5% of the workforce in 2008.68 Although the results of
government economic policies (and even the figures)69 are disputed, what is less
disputed is that fiscal and monetary expansion has spurred consumption and that
petroleum revenues have been funneled into supporting social projects (misiones,
64
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Mercal, amongst others) as well as to cooperatives and to pay for a growing
number of expropriations.
Chávez’s petroleum strategy—reinvigorating OPEC, cutting production,
driving up the targeted price range for petroleum, increasing royalty taxes,
nationalizing oil production, imposing a windfall tax70—was part of a strategy
aimed at establishing “sovereignty” over the country’s most important industry.
The increased prices in petroleum and in government revenue have allowed the
national budget to increase by a factor of almost eight since 1999. Some of this
revenue is being used very conspicuously in funding cooperatives, recovered
factories, social programs, and distribution of low-cost food.
“According to International Oil Daily, an energy trade publication, PDVSA
spent $14.4 billion on social programs in 2007 (as compared to $6.9 billion in
2005).”71 The fact that the petroleum revenues are being used for development
and sent to programs that are seen as directly benefiting the poor is applauded by
pro-Chávez supporters. It validates a sense of citizen efficacy in which their
government is responding to their interests. As one government employee
commented “among the most important accomplishments [in the area of
economics] is the recovery of the petroleum industry. I consider the state control
of the petroleum industry not only as motor of the economy, but also as a means of
national and international negotiation.”72 Or, as one agronomist explained “the
economic success is based on the use of petroleum to protect the people.”73 This
sense that petroleum is being and should be used “for the people” and that
previously elites used it “for their own benefit” and transferred their profits to the
US rather than reinvesting them is ubiquitous in Chávez’s speeches and it appears
periodically in Chavista interviewee comments about current economic
conditions.74 It is rarely identified as part of a socialist strategy but is understood
in a language of either “good governance” or “economic sovereignty.”
Establishing sovereignty has involved highly visual and dramatic expropriations including that of steel producing SIDOR (owned by the privately owned
CEMEX of Mexico) in which the energy minister and president of PDVSA (the
Venezuelan national petroleum company) along with workers and the Venezuelan
military occupied SIDOR plants.75 The visual complements the trend in
perceptions amongst investors of worsening protection for private capital
throughout the Chávez administration. The Heritage Foundation’s reports on
economic liberty, which reflect traditional neoliberal concerns, show a substantial
decrease in economic liberty since 2002.76 The decrease in the Heritage
Foundation’s indicator of economic liberty is the result of government
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intervention in markets most notably expropriations such as the 2005
nationalization VENEPAL, a paper concern, 2007 nationalization of oil production
in the Orinoco belt and the private telecommunications company (CANTV) and
the electric company (Electricidad) and the 2008 nationalizations of Banco de
Venezuela and SIDOR.
In all cases Chávez paid or has offered to pay “fair” compensation for the
seized assets and in some cases created mixed companies. What is relevant is that
the official government announced policy of taking over companies in “key” areas
remains ambiguous, Chávez has justified several expropriations based on labor
disputes, and there have been both cosmetic and policy changes to make public
ownership of corporations different. This means facilitating entry of public sector
workers into misiones which give job training or provide education. One CANTV
employee explained “I worked here for years, now that it is a public company, I
can go to the university and get a degree.”77
None of this is terribly novel given the history of populism in Latin America
and Venezuela particularly. During the last petroleum boom PDVSA and other
public companies were created. In fact, Chavismo is very similar to Punto Fijismo
in that it uses relatively inefficient versions of state-managed capitalism to employ
allies and punish enemies.78 What is more innovative is the nature of state –
business – labor relations which has changed. That relationship had been based in
corporatism and tripartite negotiations but the system broke down with labor
losing a considerable amount of negotiating power during the 1980s and 1990s.79
Chávez has engaged academics and labor leaders who reject the labor union
associated with the Punto Fijo system (CTV). Chávez placed activist/academic
Carlos Lanz in charge of ALCASA where he “pledged . . . to replace the Taylor
system which privileges worker productivity at the expense of humanitarian
working conditions.”80 When the government nationalized INVEPAL it turned
over 49% of its stock to workers and allowed workers to choose two of its five
members of the board of directors.81 At the same time, Chávez fired some 19,000
workers from PDVSA who had participated in the three-month long strike of
2002 –2003. Each case is obviously different, but it is important to recall that while
more “socialist” and “human” conditions are created for workers, the Chávez
government is not averse to punishing workers who invoke their rights in ways
that threaten his government.
The concept of populism and its top-down leader-centric vision is critical here.
It is Chávez who takes over a company ostensibly to defend its workers and he
gives new rights of participation to these workers. But it is also Chávez who, on
Aló Presidente, fired workers, read the names of people who signed petitions to call
a referendum to remove him from power, and regularly identifies who are his/the
people’s enemies.
The importance of PDVSA also suggests that PDVSA is not a company which
the government is prepared to sacrifice to “socialism.” Internal critiques abound of
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the government’s employment of state capitalism which does not change the
means of production.82 In general, public ownership has meant expanded
opportunities for public sector workers through publicly funded programs but it
has not changed management. In some cases, there has been greater worker
participation in management decisions but this has been limited to leading radical
labor leaders like Orlando Chirinos of the Unión Nacional de Trabajadores to
declare that he “ . . . rejects ‘static’ cogestión [co-management] and insists that the
system eventually transform itself into complete Worker control, at the same time
that it calls on the confederation to lead Worker takeovers of mailing companies.”83
Where the government has allowed for greater worker control has been in the
area of cooperatives, an area that has received considerable government support.
Over 140,000 cooperatives were registered with the government by 2006. But few
cooperatives would survive without government funding and supervision of
funds sent to cooperatives has been poor and even sympathetic observers
consider cooperatives to be part of an employment strategy rather than part of any
long-term and self-sustaining piece of a new productive model.84
In fact, what seems the most successful path for citizen inclusion in Bolivarian
Venezuela has been consumption. High levels of government spending, negative
interest rates, monetary expansion, an overvalued exchange, and government
programs to spur purchase of automobiles have fueled both consumption and
speculative activities. The Bolı́var is fixed at 2.150 to the US dollar though the
parallel rate fluctuated between 3.0 and 5.5 between January and August 2008.
Access to dollars at the official rate is limited and controlled through a
government agency, CADIVI. This agency has spent billions of dollars to make
low-cost dollars available to Venezuelan citizens. Venezuelan citizens were
allowed to spend up to $3,000 in international credit card purchases at the official
exchange rate in 2007, a figure later reduced to $400. Nevertheless, between those
numbers as well as access to official rate dollars when traveling, “Venezuelans
spent more than $4 billion . . . [in 2007]. By contrast, Cadivi approved just $2.2
billion for food imports, even though the government is battling serious food
shortages.”85 In January 2008, the government announced that Cadivi received
$3.6 billion in January alone.86
Venezuelans feel richer and Chavistas think that being able to consume is a
fundamental part of their identity as citizens. Bolivarians constantly invoked the
term “purchasing power” and occasionally used the increase in that as an
explanation for inflation and product shortages. But, as one critical supporter said,
the poor people “for the first time are eating chicken because of Chávez . . . There
is the power to consume but there is no development. . . . The Bolivarian schools
have advanced but they go there for food not education.”87 Similarly, a teacher
comparing the economy under Chávez with previous periods said “now, people
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travel because they have money. There are more cars. In this barrio it was difficult
to see cars. Now almost every house has a car . . . or a motorcycle.”88
Thus, while Chavismo differs from earlier populisms in that it explicitly
identifies itself as socialism and anti-capitalist and has engaged in some limited
experiments in the area of co-management, its most fundamental policies display
the traditional reliance on state capitalism. As one analyst said, “we have the same
situation as always, high prices, economic distortions strangling the domestic
market, poverty, inefficiency of the state. Honestly, I do not see anything new.”89
That the state used its increasing management of the market as a way of
generating employment and rewarding supporters and punishing opponents is
also nothing new.
What is “neo” about the populism is the reliance not on organized sectors,
mass labor unions, or political parties, but upon the multisector benefits derived
from public goods (such as an overvalued exchange rate, negative interest rates,
preferential credit). In this way, despite very different sorts of policies and
rhetoric, Chávez’s base of support shares much with Weyland’s neopopulists.
That is, the citizens are less part of a new model of economic integration where
workers participate in all aspects of the production process and more part of an
old model where citizens are integrated into the market through their wage labor
and their use of those wages to consume goods.
Sovereignty and Solidarity
Since Bolivarian citizenship understands politics as the process of mobilizing
against exclusion and repression by elite groups, it involves an awareness of the
need to establish the sovereignty of the country and repel imperialist threats. The
obvious concern of the Chávez administration in the area of foreign policy has
been how to maintain critical commercial relations with the United States while
also resisting the latter’s threats to the former’s survival. Particularly since the
April 2002 coup which briefly removed President Chávez from office, Chávez has
pursued an aggressive policy of “balancing” US hegemony by diversifying oil
markets, increased military spending, deepening relations with governments that
in some way threaten Washington (Iran, Russia, Libya, China), and trying to
absorb other countries in Latin America into a regional bloc to counter US
influence. His foreign policy has been determined by the price of petroleum and
perceived threats to his government’s survival. It is also the outgrowth of his
labeling of domestic opposition as “lackeys of the Empire” and “country-sellers.”
The need to reclaim the country from an elite who sold out the country, making
it a “colony” of the United States, fits easily into the narrative in which Bolivarian
citizens must reclaim domestic space from which they were excluded by that same
elite. As was the case with politicizing citizenship and encouraging participation
in the market, Bolivarian citizenship in this regard is developed through
polarizing discussions and mobilization. The government produced weekly La
Hojilla, regularly identifies enemies of the people and general villains. These
villains are to be found everywhere. The state of Israel, for example, is regularly
taken to task, usually in cartoons, for the conditions in which Palestinians live. The
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Dalai Lama is regularly lampooned as a stooge of the US empire.90 The majority of
the ire in La Hojilla, and in President Chávez’s discourse, is reserved for the United
States, the Colombian government, and the “oligarchs” of Venezuela. Articles
discuss US imperialism, infiltration of FBI agents amongst US activists in the
1960s, the coup against Allende, and comments on “genocide” in Iraq and
elsewhere. They show President Uribe of Colombia as a servant of President Bush,
critique Plan Colombia, and defend the FARC and the ELN.
The US remains Venezuela’s most important trade partner as the purchaser of
roughly 60% of its crude oil exports and as the largest source for its imports.91 In
fact, US exports to Venezuela have grown during the consumption boom of recent
years. Despite that, the Chávez government has traveled extensively signing
agreements in oil production and refining as well as other areas with various
governments as a way of diversifying markets and reducing dependence on the
US.92 Chávez has also been aggressive toward the US and any other country that
challenges Venezuelan sovereignty.
When Exxon Mobil won a judgment in a British court freezing as many as $12
billion of PDVSA assets in February 2008, Chávez threatened to cease selling
petroleum to the US immediately.93 A similar threat was issued when there was
speculation that the US might place Venezuela on the list of countries that support
terror. Chávez threatened to cut off oil sales to any European Union country
that supported immigration laws which were seen as anti-Latin American.94 This
recalls the comment of a government worker who considered petroleum
fundamental for the economy as well as for national and international negotiation.
On March 2, 2008, Chávez dedicated a significant amount of time on Aló
Presidente to informing the Venezuelan public about the Colombian invasion of
Ecuadorian territory to attack a FARC camp, expressing solidarity with Ecuador,
and ordering ten battalions to the border with Colombia. Immediately, he
contextualized the Colombian incursion within the narrative of Bolivarian
struggles. The attack was by a “lackey of Washington,” a “paramilitary,” a “mafia”
leader, Colombian President Uribe, and Chávez dedicated a moment of silence to
Raul Reyes, the FARC’s second in command, who died in the bombing. Reyes,
Chávez said, was a true “revolutionary,” who gave his life for peace and the
people’s struggle.95 According to Chávez, he was killed by the agents of
Washington, using military equipment made possible by Plan Colombia, while
trying to negotiate the peaceful release of hostages held by the FARC for several
years.
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Bolivarians believe that the CIA works “24 hours a day” to topple their
government96 and they see Plan Colombia as a hypocritical war of repression
which gives the US a justification to maintain a considerable military presence in
the region. Not surprisingly, a pro-Chávez university leader said: “We are very
happy with international relations, the FARC are representatives of the repressed
classes, [Colombia has] a fascist government which kills people . . . [Venezuela]
has stopped US imperialism for now, with ALBA. There is still imperialism but
now we are in Cuba, Nicaragua, Bolivia . . . ”97
The US war on drugs and terrorism, the identification of the FARC as narcoterrorists, the understanding that the Chávez government is openly sympathetic
of the FARC, and the recovery of a laptop of former FARC leading voice Raul
Reyes, have led the US government to make many declarations about Venezuela’s
lack of support for anti-drug efforts and possible support for terrorism. President
Chávez constantly includes these accusations in his speeches, linking them to the
coup against “President Salvador Allende” and “President Manuel Noriega.” The
invasion of Panama is particularly important given that its pretense, identified by
Chávez, was “drug smuggling,” and US claims of Venezuela’s lack of cooperation
in the war on drugs and terror.
Though Manuel Noriega never occupied the position of president of Panama,
the point about the US invasion on charges related to drug traffic, buoyed by
concerns of US support of opposition forces, cemented by the perception of US
involvement in April 2002,98 allows Chávez to characterize his position as being
defensive, against a ruthless imperialist threat. He returned to this theme in early
September 2008, when he expelled the US Ambassador, Patrick Duddy, in
solidarity with Evo Morales who had done the same for Duddy’s counterpart in
Bolivia. The US ambassador to Bolivia was accused of supporting separatist
military groups in Bolivia and Chávez accused Duddy of supporting a thwarted
assassination/coup attempt.99
The Chávez government played tape recorded “evidence” of a conspiracy
amongst retired generals and Chávez claimed that the United States, the private
media, traditional political parties, as well as anti-Chávez civil society was behind
the coup attempt. The accusations are fantastic, but not without some element of
credibility, particularly given the participation and/or lack of condemnation of
the above actors in the April 2002 coup. At the same time, regardless of the
veracity of Chávez’s accusations, or even their acceptance by Venezuelans, part of
being a Bolivarian citizen means seeing the CIA in every action by the Venezuelan
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opposition, part of a perpetual master plan to eliminate Venezuela’s new found
“sovereignty.”
It also means showing solidarity with the opponents of the US government. As
mentioned earlier, this means that Chavista weeklies like La Hojilla often critique
the Dalai Lama. His politics and goal of peacefully defending his “people” from an
occupying power are compatible with Bolivarian ideas of peaceful popular
struggle and the Chinese government’s brutal use of violence to suppress violence
and its considerable restrictions of freedom of press and expression are antithetical
to the modes of governance employed by the Chávez government to this point.
But the identification of Tibet independence with Washington and particularly the
US effort to impose a change in Chinese domestic policy is seen as a threat and so
Chinese sovereignty is privileged over the popular struggle of Tibetans.
Similarly, the alliance with Putin is concerning. The Chávez government
purchased $4 billion of arms between 2004 and 2008 with most of that coming
from Russia or Belarus,100 and as of September 2008, was discussing joint military
operations in the Caribbean, and thus does not appear to be a natural candidate
for solidarity. Though both Putin and Chávez regularly lash out against media,
Chávez has used “responsible journalism” laws to encourage self-censorship
whereas the Putin administration has jailed journalists. Chávez allowed
opposition RCTV’s television license to expire and it continues to function on
cable whereas Putin has closed and taken over critical television stations. Russia is
not a member of OPEC but a free-rider who has benefited from production cutting
agreements but has made it clear that it will not sacrifice its interests for the sake of
OPEC strategies. Nevertheless, Chávez makes very visible his relationship with
Putin. This is both to send a message of independence to the US and to draw the
ire of liberal domestic opposition (whom he will label as more loyal to US than
Venezuelan interests).
Similarly, his long-standing ideological (and perhaps financial and military)
support for the FARC in Colombia is also somewhat uncomfortable. While one
can compare the rhetoric of the FARC with the idea of agonistic struggles central
to Bolivarianism, the methods used are radically different. Bolivarianism relies
upon electoral victories and peaceful political processes. This may be because
Chávez’s coup in 1992 failed, that he later found that he could be competitive in
elections, and he was immediately restored to power in 2002.101 Nevertheless, as
Hellinger has written, the proceso is unique in that it has been a Revolution that has
been and is occurring through electoral processes.102 Only in June 2008, after the
appearance of documents on Reyes’ laptop linking top Chávez officials to the
FARC, did Chávez make clear his lack of support for the FARC’s methods and call
for a unilateral release of all prisoners.
Balancing the US, however, means supporting FARC and ELN in Colombia or
the Zapatistas in Mexico and other groups that act as violent and/or non-violent
opposition to elected governments.103 The hypocrisy here is easily evident as
100
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Chávez resents the presence of armed groups within the opposition who took part
in the coup against him and has been highly critical of US support for opposition
in civil society. The latter justified his expulsion of Ambassador Duddy in
September 2008. Chávez’s support for opposition in other countries is also at odds
with the idea of defendinglegitimate sovereign governments such as his defense
of Chinese, Russian, and Iranian governments’ decisions to punish their opposition
as they see fit.
Just as Bolivarianism has facilitated mobilized and organized protests to
support groups with similar goals or enemies, it has also contributed to the
politicization of Venezuelan opposition. For example, not only did pro-Chávez
interviewees critique the US and Colombia and less frequently refer to solidarity
with the FARC, but anti-Chávez interviewees referred to a struggle against
Chávez, Morales, and Ecuador’s Rafael Correa. Some offered solidarity for Uribe
and many condemned the FARC outright.
In fact, between January and August 2008, one of the most populous
demonstrations in Caracas was an anti-FARC rally which was, for all intents and
purposes, an anti-Chávez rally. Although speakers did not directly call for
support of Uribe or rejection of Chávez, the mass mobilization against the violence
of the FARC without programmatic rejection of paramilitary violence or military
abuses was a clear sign of support for Uribe. The flood of white shirts both
symbolized peace but it is also the color worn in anti-Chávez rallies and the crowd
was clearly anti-Chávez. The transnationalization of Bolivarian citizenship has
encouraged or made more explicit the opposition’s solidarity with its own set of
allies, which, in turn, validates the Bolivarian perception of a transnational
network of elites that must be overcome. This is particularly important because it
shows the shaping effect of Bolivarian citizenship even on its opponents.
Solidarity has been most prominently promoted by the Chávez government
through alternative commercial agreements, what Corrales considers part of calls
for the regime’s “social power.”104 As part of a strategy to redefine the nature of
economic and security relations vis-à-vis the US, Venezuela, and the region more
generally, Chávez has engaged in a number of high profile anti-liberal and anti-US
imperialist policies.
He purchased US$25 million worth of Ecuadorian debt105 and US$3.5 billion
worth of Argentine debt.106 In doing so, Chávez both reduced the leverage of the
US in those countries and increased the prestige of his own position vis-à-vis US
hegemony in the region particularly because he asked for nothing in return. He
promoted a joint investment project between PDVSA and PetroEcuador estimated
at $4 billion.107
In June 2005, he created PETROCARIBE, an organization through which
Venezuela sold discounted petroleum to Caribbean countries with low-interest long
term financing. The proposal involved 13 Caribbean nations, a proposal which
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that to be paid in barter.108 Originally, Petrocaribe amounted to 42,000 barrels per
day. By 2008, the figure was 85,900 barrels per day and an estimated $4.6 billion
worth of petroleum had been sent to Petrocaribe countries, not counting Cuba,109
over the four years of its existence. Of that $4.6 billion, roughly 43% was financed by
the receiving countries.110 Though Petrocaribe is not without sound business
planning, Chávez allows supporters and opponents to see it as an example of
“giving” away the country’s resources.111 Although this alienates even potential
supporters, the perception of “giving away” resources stands in obvious contrast to
US aid which is perceived as coming with very tightly drawn strings attached.
Moreover, that aid itself has decreased tremendously in recent years precisely as US
hegemony has waned. The contrast between US relations with its hemispheric
neighbors and that of Venezuela is most evident in that “Venezuela outspends the
United States in foreign aid to the rest of Latin America by a factor of at least five.
Last year, US aid amounted to $1.6 billion, a third of which went to Colombia,
mainly to fund Plan Colombia . . . Chávez, meanwhile, pledged $8.8 billion for
the region.”112
The most ambitious program to challenge neoliberalism and globalization is
ALBA (Alternativa Bolivariana para los pueblos de nuestra América), a Chávez led
agreement that aims at a more humane unification of the peoples of the Americas.
Chávez formed ALBA in 2005 along with Fidel Castro and shortly thereafter
other countries were invited to join. ALBA defines itself as “a different kind of
integration proposal. While FTAA responds to the interests of transnational capital
and pursues absolute liberalization of goods, services, and investment, ALBA
places the emphasis on the fight against poverty and social exclusion, and, in
doing so, expresses the interests of the people of Latin America.”113 The position is
primarily defensive but the weakening influence of the US has allowed for ALBA
to be a more aggressive anti-US and anti-capitalist platform. In the 2005 Summit of
the Americas in Argentina where the failure to establish a Free Trade Area of the
Americas by the original deadline set by Washington was all too apparent,
Chávez spoke of “burying” the FTAA, presumably replacing it with ALBA.
While the impact of ALBA in the area of economics is limited, the domestic
impact on Bolivarians is significant as they consider Castro, Morales, and Ortega
great statesmen who defend their causes and, in turn, whose causes they should
defend as well.114 Large rallies were held throughout Venezuela when Bolivia’s
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Evo Morales overcame a revocatory referendum in August 2008.115 As one
Chavista said “Fidel is the father, Chávez is the son. I guess Evo and Correa are the
grandchildren.”116 Though the statement was delivered with pride by a supporter,
similar comments were made sarcastically by opponents. That both groups
identify these leaders with familial language suggests that Bolivarianism has been
relatively successful in understanding the struggles of other populists in terms of
domestic conflicts.
While it is tempting to see much of this as new, the sense of resisting
US hegemony and supporting critics of US imperialism was part of earlier
populist experiments in Latin America including in Venezuela.117 Carlos Andrés
Pérez believed Venezuela’s position as the wealthiest country in the region,
bolstered by a commodity that was then at record prices, gave it both the ability
and responsibility to assume a position of leadership in the region and the
developing world more generally.118 Tellingly, Caracas is littered with statues of
various figures, such as Lázaro Cárdenas, with plaques lionizing them for
defending the liberty of their people. But these figures, while at home within
Bolivarian Venezuela, were built in previous eras where Venezuelan governments
pledged their solidarity with state-led development programs, anti-imperialist
leaders, and the New International Economic Order. Of course, this solidarity
never jeopardized commercial relations with the US.
What is different is the degree of US decline. Although the US was entering
into a relative period of decline in the 1970s, exactly when the commodity boom
facilitated Pérez’s populism, the Debt Crisis in the 1980s exaggerated the recovery
of US power within the Americas. The decline that the US faces now may be as
short-lived or part of a more permanent downward trend. What is apparent is that
while Soviet power was declining by the early 1980s, leaving the US the
predominant world power, the rise in China has created a permanent change in
international relations and challenges the US in many important ways including
in the Western Hemisphere. For example, foreign investment in Venezuela has
been abysmal relative to even smaller economies in the region in recent years, the
Venezuelan government has been negotiating a $4 billion fund with the Chinese
government which, if actualized, could bring dramatic changes.
The emphasis in this paper is not the changes made by the Chávez government
per se but the effect they have had on the notion of citizenship. Bolivarians119 do see
their struggles intertwined with those of the “pueblo” in other Latin American
countries and they see President Chávez and selected other presidents in the
region defending the pueblos against domestic oligarchs and US imperialism. They
see expansive and participatory publics and acts of solidarity and strategic
alliance building as crucial to this struggle and this constitutes a real and
significant change in inter-American relations as well as challenge to the
hegemony of neoliberal globalization and liberal democracy. The commitment to
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Notı́cias, August 10, 2008, p. 18.
116
Student, Barquisimeto, March 7, 2008.
117
Elsa Cardozo da Silva and Richard S. Hillman, “Venezuela: Petroleum,
Democratization, and International Affairs,” in Frank O. Mora and Jeanne K. Hey (eds),
Latin American and Caribbean Foreign Policy (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2003).
118
Anibal Romero, La miseria del populismo (Caracas: Centauro, 1986).
119
Again, this does not include all Venezuelan citizens.
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socialism is less clear as is the extent to which nonpolitical citizens identify with
other popular struggles. Anti-Chávez citizens may be more aware of these
linkages, lumping Chávez, Morales, Correa, Castro, and Ortega into similar
categories and supporting the US and Colombia more than they would if the US
and Colombia were not symbols for resistance against Chávez.
Refining Populism
Like other forms of populism, Chavismo emerged during a time when there was a
considerable sense of citizen alienation from the state and insecurity relative to the
market. Chávez’s answer, which has remained popular for much of the decade
that he has been in power, is to create a new type of citizenship. He has done this
by engendering a more engaged citizenry, more participation in markets for
excluded peoples, and a greater sense of solidarity with other struggling peoples
of the world. He has done so by engaging in a populism which is at once inclusive
and alienating, grants rights and services but delivers them in a partisan
environment where state/government/party differentiation is often nonexistent.
Finally, it defends itself against US imperialism by siding with governments and
groups that engage in politics that are, at least in large part, antithetical to the
values Chávez claims are fundamental to his concept of plena democracia. The
contours of this citizenship are very typical of populism.
In fact, it is an extreme form of populism. Analysis of extreme cases in the
social sciences is exploratory, giving insight into the phenomenon observed rather
than assessing causality.120 This article has attempted to explore the aspects in
which Chávez’s populism has configured citizenship in order to better identify
what populism is and is not. This is not as straightforward as it would appear.
Most definitions of populism emphasize the political nature of populism—the
multiclass support, the top-down channels of authority, and the centralization of
the movement’s identity around a leader.121 These definitions do not explicitly
imply any policy content. This is contrasted with others who treat economic
nationalism and/or policies designed to facilitate inclusion as fundamental
aspects of populism.122 Exploration of Chavismo is instructive in that roughly
from 1999 until 2002, Chávez aimed to reconstruct political institutions through a
new constitution and pursued a policy that was mildly defensive of sovereignty
but his economic policies were largely liberal.123 Only after the coup in 2002 did
Chávez begin a more aggressive series of policy initiatives that could be
characterized as economic nationalist and inclusion-oriented. Nevertheless,
Chávez had been the extreme example of “populism” within the Americas, even
during his “neoliberal period,” suggesting that policy content is secondary to the
populist label. Additionally, support for Chávez’s economic policies receives its
largest support from the increased purchasing power of consumers rather than
greater rights and more co-management opportunities for workers, just like
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Weyland’s neoliberal neopopulists whose economic policy content would not be
traditionally considered populist, or at least left populist.
A second implication from the exploration of Chávez’s populism is relevant to
Roberts’ definition of populism as “top-down.” This is critical for Roberts as he
distinguishes the bases of support of Chávez as populist and Morales as
“autonomous grassroots mobilization.”124 Though there is a real difference in the
two cases in the nature of mobilization, it may be overstated by Roberts’ typology.
Scholars are increasingly uncomfortable with speaking of top-down pressures for
fear of denying agency to actions of base and middle-level members of political
movements. Autonomy is something that was conceived within a liberal
framework and the relations between states, movements, leaders, and followers
are too messy to be relegated to a discrete distinction according to autonomy or
not.125 There is an important bottom-up element in Chavismo just as, especially
since coming to power, there is an important top-down element to Morales’
rule.126 But Roberts is correct in highlighting relative differences in power and
Morales’ base may be understood as more autonomous if autonomy is understood
as a continuous variable.
Scholarly debates about populism may be better off avoiding discussions of
top-down vs bottom-up tensions and instead focus on the leader-centrism of
populism and how much agency the leader and his or her immediate circle have
relative to the different layers of their followers. Here the Chávez example is
telling in its extremity. Barrio residents do not always respond to calls to action
especially if they come from discredited local leaders/representatives of the
ultimate leader, but the leader’s presence in their political life is fundamental and
hyperpresidentialist petro-states privilege the president versus almost any form of
local organizations when commodity prices are high.
That is, an exploration of the extreme case of populism in Bolivarian Venezuela
suggests that populism’s most defining characteristics are its leader-centrist
orientation, its anti-elite rhetoric, and the multiclass support on which it is based.
Left populists may be more inclined to engage in certain policies, or they may do
so when economic conditions permit as Chávez has done. Some populists may
organize the sectors that support them into national movements or political
parties (such as Haya de la Torre in Peru or Perón in Argentina), others may prefer
them unorganized (Fujimori in Peru), and others may organize them in ephemeral
institutions (Chávez).127 But common to all is the centrality of the leader, the
attacks against privileged sectors, and the support of large sectors who believe
themselves to be excluded.
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